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Abstract 
 
In the last decade, Italy has experienced a considerable decentralization of functions to 
the regions. This transformation has been especially relevant for the National Health 
System that has de facto assumed a federal system design. The federal reform aimed at 
disciplining public health expenditure, which drains a substantial share of the budget of 
Italian regions and is among the main causes of the regional deficits. Political economic 
analysis, however, suggests that impact of federalism on public expenditure depends on 
central and local government strategies to win in the electoral competition. Results 
derived in this preliminary study indicate that political competition actually works as a 
tool of fiscal discipline; it shows a restraining effect on public health expenditure.  
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1. Introduction 
 
It is well known that public expenditure can be strongly influenced by political 
economic matters. The strategic utilization of public resources to support the re-
election of political representatives has been extensively explored, among others, 
by the literature on political business cycles and on interest groups’ lobbying [see 
Mueller (2003)]. Moreover, the theoretical analysis has highlighted how the 
pursue of political goals may not only induce excessive spending but also the 
adoption of inefficient forms of transfers, even in presence of efficient (or less 
inefficient) ones [Alesina et al. (1999), Coate and Morris (1995), Hillman (1989), 
Magee et al. (1989)].       
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 2 
The scenario is further complicated by the presence of multiple policymakers, 
as in the case of fiscal federalism. In fact, on the one hand centralization may 
trigger free-riding and local over-expenditure while, on the other hand, 
decentralization generates externalities related to horizontal and vertical 
competition [Persson and Tabellini (2000)].
1
 Theoretical and empirical analyses 
suggest that the impact of decentralization on expenditure is likely to be 
ambiguous because of several counteracting effects. For example, while fiscal as 
well as political competition may constrain expenditure growth [see Mueller 
(2003)], political decentralization may have a positive impact on public 
expenditure for several reasons. For example, local communities may decide to 
expand public services when they (and not the national government) control 
provision. Moreover, the multiplication of centers of policymaking is likely to 
determine additional costs. In addition, from a political economic perspective, a 
larger number of legislative districts may imply more redistribution and pork-
barrel, causing public overspending [as shown by Weingast et al. (1981)].  
Regarding this issue, some studies have pointed out that the impact of 
decentralization on the size of government depends on the specific institutional 
framework. In this respect, separation of powers and open rules of decision-
making seem to limit over-expenditure under centralization.
2
   
In a decentralized framework, the ways in which local expenditure is financed 
does have an impact on the magnitude of the public sector. A recent literature has 
focused on the political determinants of intergovernmental grants. They represent 
a cost for the financing government, whereas the political benefits of their 
utilization often accrue to the spending (local) agents. This simple observation 
suggests that the political motivations of grants can be at least as fundamental as 
the efficiency and equity justifications, and a growing number of studies indicate 
that intergovernmental grants indeed are often assigned to maximize the political 
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 Besley and Coate (2003) compare the costs of common pool effect with the benefits of 
internalization of spillovers deriving from centralization. It is shown that, with centralization, a 
cooperative legislature will over-provide public goods. The reason is that local voters will 
strategically appoint representatives with high demand for spending. In Dur and Roelfsema (2005), 
that result is reverted in the case costs cannot be shared among districts (as in the case of 
environmental regulation or shelter provision to asylum seekers). 
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 3 
return for the donor.
3
 Moreover grants are occasionally instrumental to bail-out 
local governments under financial troubles [Rodden et al. (2003)].  
Potential over-expenditure is clearly linked to an inadequate control of the 
electorate that allows a government to increase the size of the public sector in 
order to pursue its own goals. Public choice literature indicates that the design of a 
specific institutional framework characterized by check and balances and adequate 
electoral competition may help the community to tame the Leviathan and/or to 
hinder particularistic policies favouring interest groups [Wittman (1995)]. In this 
paper we concentrate on the latter aspect of a competitive political market.  
In principle, the impact that political competition may have on the size of the 
public sector is ambiguous. On the one hand, we can presume that stronger 
competition will induce the government to behave more efficiently, even in case 
of particularistic policies [Becker (1983, 1985)]. On the other hand, more 
competition could induce expansionary policies by the incumbent to reinforce his 
or her political position. However, such policies can be undertaken also through 
tax reduction, and not necessarily through an increase in expenditure. 
Furthermore, political consensus can be acquired also by improving the quality of 
the services, with a potentially positive impact on expenditure.  
In a recent study, Solé-Ollé (2006) investigates the impact of political 
competition on the local expenditure of 500 Spanish municipalities in the period 
between 1992 and 1999. He finds evidence that the size of the electoral margin of 
the incumbent has a positive influence on expenditure. Building on that study, we 
attempt to verify the impact of political competition on health expenditure of the 
Italian regions from 1990 to 2003. Health expenditure accounts for the largest 
share of regional expenditure and represents the main example of decentralization 
of public expenditure. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a synthetic but 
comprehensive description of the evolution of decentralization in Italy. This 
analysis is helpful to put in the right perspective the links between the growth of 
public sector and decentralization in the specific case of Italy. An analysis of 
potential tools to impose fiscal discipline is also provided. After a brief 
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 Guccio and Mazza (2005) provide a small survey of the empirical studies verifying the impact of 
political economic variables on the allocation and/or size of intergovernmental grants.   
 4 
description of the Italian health care system, the decentralization of health 
responsibilities at a regional level and the relevant literature on the determinants 
of regional health expenditure, Section 3 illustrates the empirical framework for 
the investigation of the impact of political competition on health expenditure, 
describes the dataset and discusses the estimation results. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. The fiscal discipline of intergovernmental relations in Italy 
 
2.1. The Italian state was born as a unitary state 
The Italian state was born in the second half of the XIX century through the 
unification of several existing states, under the monarchs of Piedmont. The 
founding fathers did not accept the proposal, supported by several scholars, to 
adopt the model of a federation. Because of the too many differences among 
institutions, laws, economies, customs and languages
4
, they believed that the 
model of a unitary state was necessary for nation building.  
The organization of the State replicated the model of Piedmont, which, on turn, 
followed that of Napoleon’s France. It included three levels of government: 
central, provincial, and municipal. This structure stayed in place until the 
endorsement of the Constitution of the Republic in 1948. The Constitution 
introduced a fourth level of government – the regional one – immediately 
subordinate to the central level. Five regions (Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, 
Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardinia, and Sicily) obtained a special autonomy.  
Functions assigned to provinces and municipalities related to the 
administration of local public services, but local authorities had little power to 
actually rule the matter. The State retained most of the power; it decided which 
services local authorities had to provide and which services they could 
discretionally decide to provide. Local authorities have never been able to 
intervene when national laws did not provide it for. At the end of the XIX century 
ruling classes shared the worry that socialist run municipalities would pursue 
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 5 
redistribution policies. However, in the XX century many services provided by 
private companies through concessions passed to municipalities.  
Consumption taxes on a great variety of goods were the main feature of 
municipal finance. They survived for more than a century, though they were 
modified several times with changes of taxable income and tax rates depending on 
the financial needs of municipalities
5
. In accordance with the zeitgeist of the time, 
the State did not have redistribution functions, for a long time; hence there were 
not redistribution transfers in favour of the areas with a lower per capita tax 
contribution capacity. However, an implicit redistribution policy did take place as 
local authorities of poorer area were allowed to run deficits accumulating 
substantial debt loads.  
Italian municipalities have always complained about the scarcity of resources 
available as opposed to their tasks. They have also complained about the fact that 
the State transferred them national tasks, especially at times of financial crises. 
Sometimes, their pressure led to the transfer to the centre of some of these tasks, 
reducing the pressure on municipal finances.  
Financial discipline was achieved through traditional instruments such as 
declaration of difficulties, national control, and the electoral mechanism. The 
electoral mechanism, however, was distorted for a long time as there were limits 
(linked to sex, social status and education) to the right to vote; thus, the 
institutions redistributing the fiscal burden did not represent lower classes.
6
  
 
2.2. Intergovernmental relations in the first and second post-war periods 
The upheaval in intergovernmental financial relations that followed WW1 led to 
their radical reform. The State centralized various tasks previously delegated to 
local authorities – especially concerning education – and normalized the tax 
system leading to the reduction of income. Local per capita expenditure, which in 
1912 amounted to 1/3 of the national one, declined to less than 16%. The central 
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 Revenue also derived from a tax on family income and the possibility to add, next to the national 
tax, a tax on income from land and buildings. This rule applied also to provinces and it represented 
the main source of tax return. 
6
 In the South the percentage of people entitled to vote was half compared to Northeast. Only in 
1912 universal suffrage was extended to the male population, and in 1946 also to the female 
population.  
 6 
commission for local finance (CCFL – Commissione Centrale per la Finanza 
Locale), which used to have only an advisory role, played an important part; it had 
the power to intervene on the budget of each institution, reducing their 
expenditures and/or increasing their fiscal income.  
During the WW2 and the post-war period, local expenditure further decreased.
7
 
However, successively, it started to increase under the nation-wide expectation of 
good quality local services, supported by the pro-South policies of the national 
government, and the relaxation of the control system. The CCFL stopped being 
the guardian of fiscal discipline, and became the executive board responsible for 
the result of the bargaining process between national and local politicians to 
obtain and keep electoral consensus.
8
  
Deficit of local budgets were continuously approved and covered with 
mortgages from the loan institution Cassa Depositi e Prestiti – CDP. Debt was 
financed with further debts as the deficit included interests on previous debts. This 
strategy caused a long crisis of local finances worsened by the fact that the system 
of higher municipal tax was expensive
9
 and surtaxes on buildings and land had 
limited contingence sensitivity
10
.  
 
2.3. The reform of 1971: the introduction of a derivate local finance 
These features explain the reason why, the reform of the Italian fiscal system that 
took place in the 1960s, focused on the need to regulate intergovernmental 
financial relations. The idea that expenditure autonomy instead of fiscal autonomy 
was sufficient to guarantee local autonomy prevailed. However, the Parliament 
neither approved the bill to reform local finance defined by the commission in 
charge, nor it accepted the government’s proposals. Therefore, within the general 
reform of the fiscal system of 1971, only a partial reform of local finance took 
place. The reason was that the Parliament was still defining the powers of the 
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 In 1949 it represented less than 13% of national expenditure.  
8
 The right to vote had been extended to the whole population. 
9
 In the 1960s the cost of collecting taxes on consumption, as a percentage of the total tax income, 
corresponded to more than 18%, six times more expensive than the cost to collect the homologous 
national tax on business.  
10
 Tax bases on land and buildings were checked by the land register and were updated with delay 
and without connection to inflation, also because of the electoral pressure of interested taxpayers.  
 7 
Regions,
11
 and the financial relations of the latter with local authorities were not 
clear yet.  
An income tax (excluding subordinate work earned income) was introduced to 
finance sub-national governments.
12
 However, the State still collected that income 
waiting for the reform to be completed. The financing of the regions took place 
through quotas of national taxes corresponding to the cost of the national 
functions devolved to them, without introducing tax autonomy. The main local 
taxes and quotas of national taxes were abolished, ad hoc transfers (to be 
periodically adjusted) were introduced and Municipalities were given a tax on the 
increase of the value of buildings. Local authorities running deficits were given 
further resources as long as they would start programs of budgetary reclaim. 
However, the objective to restore local authorities finance through taxes did not 
succeed: local authorities running deficits did not respect the over mentioned 
programs and increased in number. The inflation of the 1970’s worsened the 
financial crisis. Thus, in 1977 the State intervened again with a new fiscal reform, 
which aimed to consider in advance the total needs of local finance. Limits to the 
increase of local current expenses, smaller than the rate of inflation, were 
introduced with consequent reduction of expenditure in real terms. More strict 
rules about investment expenditures and the related loans came into force. Local 
authorities (with the exception of smaller municipalities) were not allowed to hire 
new personnel, and wages had to be approved by the Central Commission, which 
was responsible only for this. The existing local taxes and tariffs increased and 
local authorities had the obligation to balanced budget and could not get into debts 
to finance current expenses. The State covered with ad hoc transfers the deficit of 
those local authorities that did not respect these measures.  
These measures had two main pitfalls. The reorganization of local finance was 
based on the evaluation of financial needs that resulted insufficient when 
compared to reality. This did not stop the process of negotiation aiming to obtain 
a favourable treatment; on the contrary, it perpetuated the same problem that it 
intended to solve. The local authorities that had mismanaged and those that had 
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 Successively, the Constitutional Court extended the exclusion to self-employment earned 
income. 
 8 
increased their expenditures beyond the need of their population were rewarded, 
whereas efficient local authorities were penalized. Local expenditure consolidated 
through time, with periodical increases to account for inflation.  
At the same time, Regions became responsible for the administration of the 
national health system, though the central level of government fixed the needs 
according to the amount of services provided within the whole nation also to 
citizens who did not pay taxes. The taxes collected from companies and workers 
covered the cost. 
 
2.4. The strengthening of tax autonomy in the 1990s 
In the 1990s, the limits connected to the system of controls necessary for effective 
financial intergovernmental relations lead to the need to give tax authority to sub-
national governments. The idea being that voters control on expenditure increase 
was more efficient than any other instrument. Furthermore, the constraints in the 
use of transfers prevented sub-national governments from having real expenditure 
autonomy. 
In 1992, a municipal tax on buildings (Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili - ICI) 
was established.
13
 Provinces became responsible for some national taxes. Also 
regions got tax autonomy through the introduction of the regional tax on 
productive activities (Imposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive - IRAP) that 
substituted social contributions and other national taxes charged to companies. 
They were also entitled to surtax the tax on personal income (Imposta sul Reddito 
delle Persone Fisiche - Irpef), with a minimum and maximum tax rate allowed. 
As a consequence of these reforms, local authorities’ tax revenue increased 
from less than 7% of total income in 1978 to 45% in 2002. During the least years 
the role of this revenue diminished because of the increase of transfers connected 
to the devolution of new functions on one side, and of the limits to the increase of 
tax rates on the other side. In 2008, in contrast with the previous measures 
favouring fiscal federalism, the municipal tax on homes was abolished within the 
present government’s program of reduction of fiscal pressure.  
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 There was a common tax rate of 4%, but in 1996 municipalities got the power to increase it 
(within the ceiling of 7%) and to allow for tax exemptions and tax breaks.  
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At the beginning of 2000, a wider attempt to reform the regional finance, 
aiming at introducing fiscal federalism principles, did not succeed though the 
Parliament had approved it. The program planned to transfer to the regions 40% 
of the financing of the health system (instead of the amount corresponding to their 
needs). Poorest regions would obtain transfers to partially supplement their per 
capita tax income compared to the national average. However, because of the 
opposition of these regions, the system was not implemented.  
 
2.5. The Interior Stability Pact  
In the same years, two important laws deeply modified financial 
intergovernmental relations. Following the accession to the European Monetary 
Union and the Stability and Growth Pact, Italy could not overcome the annual 
limit of 3% of budget deficit for the whole public administration. The objective 
was that of reaching break even in the long term and of reducing the public debt to 
80% of GDP.
14
 These obligations required consistent behaviour from sub-national 
governments.  
In 1999, the financial law introduced the Interior Stability Pact (Patto di 
Stabilità Interno - PSI) to rule the financial administration of these governments. 
The main objective of this pact was that of controlling the public financial 
balances, but its structure varied through years according to the bodies involved, 
the limits or the reduction of current expense, the relevant budget items, and the 
system of rewards and punishments. The inclusion in the pact of limits to or 
reduction of public expenditure seems in conflict with the principles of autonomy 
that the Italian Constitution set.
15
. The success of the pact was limited because of 
the delay (two years) in the application of the penalties for those governments that 
did not comply.
16
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 In 1994, public debt reached 121.5% compared to 41% of 1970. 
15
 The Constitutional Court admitted them only as an extraordinary measure. 
16
 Although, there are not official data about the respect of the rules set, in 2006 18% of 
municipalities, among those that provided information, were not complying with the rules of the 
Pact. 
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2.6. The reform of the Constitution of 2001 
In 2001 a long political debate on the reform of the constitutional organization of 
financial intergovernmental relations, aiming at attributing wider administrative 
and legislative functions to sub-national governments, came to an end. The 
Constitution set the legislative functions of the State and the competing functions 
of the state and the regions, leaving to the latter all the matters not explicitly 
considered. The principle of subsidiarity came into force as for administrative 
functions; hence municipalities have authority unless when, for economic of 
suitability reasons, higher levels of government have authority.  
As means of finance, sub-national governments can rely on their own taxes as 
well as shares of national taxes related to the areas under their authority. Bodies 
with a lower per capita fiscal capacity obtained redistributing transfers without 
destination constraint to allow the financing of all their functions. The reform also 
introduced extraordinary tools to finance single bodies in need. It was possible to 
get into debts only to finance investment expenditures.  
However, this reform has not taken place, yet. Under the Berlusconi’s 
government, a special Commission was created in order to propose a new system 
of public finance according to the suggestions of the Conference State-Local 
authorities (Conferenza unificata Stato-Autonomie). These suggestions, though, 
were never stated because the Parliament was considering a wider reform of 
federalism,
17
 and because the Conference did not reach an agreement. The 
Commission, thus, for almost five years, mainly produced studies and researches. 
The successive Prodi’s government presented a bill (disegno di legge - ddl) to 
implement fiscal federalism, which became invalid following the fall of that 
government and the early end of the legislature. The successive Berlusconi’s 
government prepared a new bill following that prepared by Prodi.  
The main issues in the implementation of the constitutional reform relate to: 
the level of equalization (perequazione), the governments entitled to equalization, 
the relation between the regions and local authorities. To evaluate the adequacy of 
the resources available to sub-national governments, it is necessary to consider the 
standard costs related to their functions. The most recent bill proposes to 
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 The reform was approved but it was later rejected through a popular referendum.  
 11 
distinguish these functions in two categories: a) those referring to services related 
to political and civil rights of citizens (health, education, and assistance); b) all the 
others. As for the former category, governments with smaller per capita 
contributing power must receive redistributing transfers to cover the lack of 
resources deriving from taxes and other shares. For the other functions, there is a 
non-complete redistribution of funds.  
The distinction of these two categories of functions has been criticized, as it is 
not based on the constitutional norms regulating redistribution. Other criticisms 
related to the determination of the regional expenses concerning the second 
category of functions. The calculation refers to the total amount of the current 
national transfers for those expenses. These transfers have to be abolished and 
substituted with new taxes, the average tax rate of which has to be calculated 
referring to this total amount (neglecting the amount of transfers received by each 
government/body). As a consequence, for poorer regions, i.e. the southern ones, 
which at present receive the highest pre capita grants, the reference for 
redistribution will decrease. Moreover, for these regions per capita fiscal capacity 
is calculated referring to the national average and not to that of the richest region. 
The limits of the planned redistribution system involve also the new national 
functions that in line with the constitutional reform will be devolved to the sub-
national levels of government. These functions will be financed according to the 
rules mentioned above. As a result, the poorer regions, where now public services 
are financed by the state, will have to increase fiscal pressure to maintain the 
current level of services, or will have to accept a lower level of services. Local 
authorities criticise the present bill because of their subordination to regions and 
the reduction of their autonomy. 
To ensure the respect of the European Community’s obligations, a special 
technical body, composed by members of the various levels of government, will 
control the fiscal discipline of intergovernmental relations. The system envisages 
rewards for the efficient governments and penalties for those who do not respect 
the rules.
18
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 Punishments include the automatic increase of tax rates, the impossibility to enrol personnel or 
to make discretionary expenses, as well as penalties for governmental or administrative bodies.  
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2.7. The tools to impose fiscal discipline: electoral mechanism, control and bail-
out 
Two objectives have been behind the reforms of intergovernmental relations that 
have been taking place in Italy in the last decades leading to the revision of the 
Constitution. First, to increase collective welfare, expanding the autonomy of sub-
national governments; in this way, the supply of public services can better 
correspond to citizens’ demand, taking into account the local peculiarities. 
Second, to put a limit to the continuous increase of public expenditure and debt 
burden by increasing administrators’ responsibilities through the attribution to the 
local governments of taxing powers (in place of national transfers) in order to 
foster electoral control of the taxpayers.  
The second objective has been widely debated. It has been argued that, to make 
sub-national governments fully responsible, taxes has to finance expenses, since 
national transfers tend to stimulate those governments to reduce taxes and to 
manage inefficiently the resources obtained. Actually, this is true for those 
subordinate governments that finance their activities first through taxes and, 
successively, using national transfers. However, if the framework is characterized 
by a derivate finance, as it is the case in Italy, the attribution of a higher degree of 
tax autonomy can stimulate administrators’ efficiency. In fact, taxes (introduced 
because of the higher degree of autonomy), instead of national transfers, influence 
administrators’ choices. Administrators have to choose whether to maintain the 
same degree of expenditure and services offered asking for new taxes, or to curtail 
the level of expenditure through better administration reducing pressure on 
taxpayers. Transfers, though reduced, are fix assets in their budgets; decisions 
relates only to taxes. 
The Italian experience, as in other countries, has led to doubt the efficacy of the 
electoral mechanism as a tool to control fiscal discipline of intergovernmental 
relations. The literature has highlighted some aspects of the problem. Sub-national 
governments violating the discipline can get support from the central government, 
especially when on both levels the same parties or coalition are in charge. Bail-out 
reduces, if not eliminates, the negative effects of bad administration on taxpayers. 
 13 
The latter do not reduce consensus to politicians in charge who, in turn, use their 
electoral success to sustain their political partners at national elections.  
In Italy, the electoral mechanism showed a further limit. In the poorer regions 
with slower development public expenditure represents a tool to get consensus; it 
allows the creation of assisted electoral clienteles to realize electoral exchange: 
public favours for political support. Electors consider these favours within a 
framework where there are few chances of earning through the market, and 
political support is useful to enter the public administration and have a career 
there (and sometimes also within private companies benefiting from public 
financing), and they do not consider the negative effect on the quality of public 
administration. In several cases of regional or municipal elections, administrations 
running deficits, and thus subject to sanctions, or with a poor quality of services, 
were re-elected from voters thanks to the nepotistic policies.  
For electoral mechanism to function properly taxpayers-voters must have 
information about the relation between services quality and the responsibility of 
those providing them on the one side. On the other side, they must have 
information about the connection between tax load and the body imposing taxes. 
Apart from the cases of fiscal illusion that hide the real tax burden, it has to be put 
in evidence that some forms of local tax collection may induce the taxpayers to 
interpret them as state taxes. However, when more governments of different levels 
are responsible for the provision of a public service, e.g. health, it is difficult for 
taxpayers to understand who is responsible in case of bad administration of the 
service. This is even more the case when a technical body, separated from the 
government, is in charge for the provision of the service.  
 
2.8. The role of the market 
The market is an additional instrument to promote fiscal discipline. First, in the 
capital market, sub-national governments can get funds to finance investments. 
They used to finance also current expenditure through debts, but now the 
Constitution forbids it. It is still unclear how to define investment expenditures: 
wide definitions allow for inefficient behaviour, but strict definitions risk limiting 
investments in human resources.  
 14 
Local authorities can use derivatives to substitute existing debts, with initial 
gains from interests to be used for current expenditures. As a consequence, the 
state has disciplined this issue also because of the crisis that has characterized the 
market of these products.  
The prohibition to use debts to cover current expenditures, however, can be 
eluded, though temporarily, delaying the payment to firms providing goods and 
services to public administrations. Using this device, governments with financial 
problems have highly increased their debt load for current expenditures especially 
in the health sector. Their difficulties have worsened and they have exerted strong 
pressure to get help from higher levels of government worried about the spread of 
financial problems among firms for which public administrations are the main, if 
not unique, client.  
Another form of elusion of this prohibition, results from the negative impact of 
disputes with creditor firms or employees about wage increases. These 
controversies generate further costs to cover trial expenses or interests on credits.  
The market can also play an important role in imposing fiscal discipline to the 
provision of local public services whose costs are covered through tariffs paid by 
users. These services are often supplied within a natural monopoly and local 
authorities tend to neglect an efficient management, increasing the amount of 
employees for nepotistic reasons without introducing technological innovations. 
When private companies provide these services through concessions 
(concessioni), the possibility to use tariffs to cover administrative inefficiencies 
does not stimulate public expenditure control. In this framework competition in 
the market cannot exist, but it is possible to have competition for the market 
imposing limits to direct administration (in house) of services and the introduction 
of calls for tenders to assign the concessions. The calls stimulate competition 
among firms aspiring to the concession and this brings to the most convenient 
conditions both for public administrations and users.  
In Italy, a reform following this line has been introduced, but it is not being 
implemented because of the resistance of local authorities and some political 
parties (belonging also to the majority). Local authorities want to keep control 
over public bodies, as this is a tool to obtain electoral consensus. Parties believe 
 15 
that in some cases, like water management, provision from a private firm, 
although regulated and under public control, does not respond to public interest. 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1. The Italian NHS and the decentralization process 
Italy has a National Health Service (NHS) - Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, SSN - 
which was established in 1978 to replace the previous system of health insurance 
funds. It provides all citizens and legal residents with comprehensive care 
throughout the country.
19
 For a long time, the system has been characterized by 
inappropriate incentives to foster expenditure control given that spending 
responsibilities were allocated to regional governments while the financing was to 
be guaranteed by the State through centrally assigned budgets. This situation 
caused systematic expenditure overruns, resulting in frequent deficits which were 
covered ex-post by the national government, without imposing any credible 
sanction to the overspending regions.  
In the 1990s, the need to curb spending so as to meet the Maastricht criteria has 
led to undertake a set of reforms with the threefold aim of introducing 
managerialism within the health system, creating an internal market for health 
services and increasing the autonomy of regions in both the financing and delivery 
of health care. The devolution of political powers to regional governments was 
further strengthen in 2001, when an amendment was made to the Title V of the 
Constitution. The new article 117 reserves the State the exclusive right to 
determine “the essential levels of services concerning civil and social rights that 
must be guaranteed on the whole national territory” and introduces safeguard of 
health amongst the subjects concerning concurrent legislation between State and 
regions. As a result, health care responsibilities are shared between the State, 
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 The SSN was originally organized on the basis of a strictly vertical three tier structure of 
government: central (Ministry of Health), regional (20 Regional Health Authorities, RHAs) and 
local (local health agencies, Unità Sanitarie Locali, USL). A National Health Fund (Fondo 
Sanitario Nazionale, FSN) was created which was financed mainly from general taxation, 
employer and employee payroll contributions and a health tax levied on self-employed. This was 
determined annually by the central government and allocated up to down.  
 16 
which set the general objectives of health policies through the National Plan and 
defines the basic health benefit package (Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza, LEA)
20
 
to be provided uniformly across the country, and regions, which are in charge of 
guaranteeing the provision of LEAs but are also free to administer and organize 
the supply in accordance with their population needs.
21
 
Parallel to the devolution process, the introduction of fiscal federalism resulted 
in an alignment between funding and spending powers, making regions 
financially accountable for any health deficit they incur by allowing them to raise 
local taxes (to a limited extent) and to introduce cost-sharing on drugs and 
services.
22
 Starting from 2001, the National Health Fund is formally abolished and 
regional funds come from a regionally collected tax on productive activities 
(Imposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive, IRAP), a regional share and 
surcharge of the centrally administered personal income tax (Imposta Personale 
sul Reddito, IRPEF), and a set amount of the per litre petrol excise. To pursue 
equity principles, an inter-regional equalisation mechanism (Fondo di 
Perequazione Nazionale, FPN), financed by a fixed proportion of the national 
VAT revenue, had to be developed to transfer funds to those regions unable to 
raise sufficient resources to meet population health care needs
23
. 
As a consequence of all these reforms, regions have used their autonomy to 
introduce different organizational models of health care. Moreover, the increased 
decentralization and reliance on regional sources of finance has even exacerbated 
the interregional divergences in both funding and spending on health care. This 
notwithstanding, health expenditure accounts for the largest share of total 
expenditure in all regions, with values that in 2006 reached an average of 74,13% 
in regions with ordinary autonomy and 44,82% in those with special one (figure 
1).  
 
                                                 
20
 LEA covers all medical care considered to be necessary, appropriate, and cost-effective. 
21
 An overview of the Italian health care system, which includes the debate on the regional 
responsibilities is provided by France et al. (2005). 
22
 For further details on the Italian health care financing system, see Bordignon et al. (2002).  
23
 The amount of funds transferred to or received from the FPN had to be determined according to 
a complex formula, allowing for the fiscal capacity of a region, its population size and age 
composition, its historic expenditure on health care, the size and the specific characteristics of its 
territory. 
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Fig 1. Share of regional health care expenditure on total current expenditure (2006) 
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Source: ISTAT  
ROA = Regions with ordinary autonomy. 
RSA = Regions with special autonomy. 
 
 
3.2. The determinants of regional health expenditure 
In the last few years, the determinants of health expenditure in single countries 
with either a federal system (e.g. USA, Canada and Switzerland) or multiple 
autonomous jurisdictions (e.g. Spain and Italy) have been examined.  
Compared to the vast array of studies based on international data, disentangling 
factors driving health care expenditure at a sub-national level allows to reduce 
part of the existing heterogeneity across countries attributable to differences in the 
extent of health converge and internal design [Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998)]. 
Following the ongoing international debate, most papers have focus on 
estimating the relationship between income and within-country public per capita 
health expenditure. They have reached the conclusion that health care is not a 
luxury good [for Canada, Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998) and Ariste and Carr 
(2001); for the USA, Freeman (2003); for Spain, Costa-Font and Pons-Novell 
(2007)] and that international income elasticities are generally larger than national 
or regional ones [Di Matteo (2003)].  
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Apart from income, ageing population and structural characteristics of health 
care supply relating to economies of scale (number of beds per hospital) and 
productivity (the number of personnel per hospital) have also proved to be 
relevant drivers of regional per capita health expenditure both in Italy [Giannoni 
and Hitiris (2002)] and in Spain [Cantarero (2005)]. 
However, the role played by income and demographic variables in explaining 
health care expenditure of sub-levels of government has been recently questioned. 
Using US state-level and Canadian province-level data, Di Matteo (2005) shows 
that ageing population distributions and income explain a relatively small portion 
of health expenditures when a time trend variable, as a proxy for technological 
change, is added to the model. Crivelli et al. (2005) find that cantonal per capita 
socialized health expenditure in Switzerland seems to be income independent, 
because of the fixed package of health care benefits offered to all residents.  
The decentralization framework does seem to be important in estimating health 
expenditure. Costa-Font and Rico (2006) conclude that devolution in Spain has 
not widen interregional inequalities in health expenditure but fiscally accountable 
Autonomous Communities exhibit a higher per capita health expenditure, once 
controlling for other determinants. By applying a multilevel hierarchical model to 
a unique sample of 110 regions in eight OECD countries in 1997, Lopez-
Casasnovas and Saez (2007) find that where there is decentralization to the 
regions, policies aimed at emulating diversity tend to increase national health care 
expenditure. Moreover, without fiscal decentralization, central monitoring of 
finance tends to reduce regional diversity and therefore decreases national health 
expenditure. Similarly, Cantarero Prieto and Lago-Peñas (2009) assume that 
whenever the central government commitment toward fiscal equalization is strong 
and/or public health expenditure is financed by specific grants, the regional 
income elasticity of public health expenditure is lower. Consistently, they find 
that regional GDP growth is translated into more health care expenditure only in 
those Spanish regions enjoying higher tax autonomy.  
Few papers have specifically taken into account the public budget mechanisms 
used to finance regional health care. For the Italian case, Levaggi and Zanola 
(2003) empirically demonstrate an asymmetry in the response to 
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intergovernmental grants: local expenditure is highly responsive to increases in 
grants-in-aid from central government, but it is relatively insensitive to grants 
reduction (a “flypaper effect”). Furthermore, the introduction of a soft-budget 
constraint hypothesis results in a stronger effect of grants and a lower response of 
own resources which indicates that, before reducing expenditure, regional 
governments prefer to incur in some deficit. Bordignon and Turati (2009) 
contribute further to the literature on soft budget constraints. Their results show 
that the link between ex-ante funding and expenditure is stronger when regional 
expectations of future bailing out are lower. Moreover, they show that during the 
1990s more autonomous Italian regions had lower expectations for future bailing 
out and that a political “alignment effect” existed, with regions ruled by politically 
“friendly” governments reducing health expenditure more than those run by 
“unfriendly” ones.24 
Political factors have proved to exert an influence on public health care 
decision-making at a sub-national level. As for Spain, Costa-Font
 
and Pons-
Novell (2007)
 
find evidence suggesting that decentralization and the political 
ideology of the incumbent parties running the health system of the Autonomous 
Communities - in a context characterized by some inter-jurisdictional competition 
- may foster mechanisms leading towards the expansion of health care 
expenditure. Evidence of spatial interactions between neighbouring Spanish 
regions in spending decisions is also found in Costa-Font and Moscone (2008). 
With regard to political effects, their findings stress the need to consider the 
interaction between ideology and income. Indeed, regional left-wing incumbents 
raise public health expenditure in relatively richer regions, which is in part due to 
the increasing competition with the private sector in such areas. Finally, 
examining the determinants of the public-private balance of health care 
expenditures in Canada, Di Matteo (2009) finds that provinces governed by 
centre-left parties are associated with lower public shares in the physician and 
other health professional categories. 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) provide empirical support for the impact of partisan 
alignment in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in Spain in the decade 1993-2003.    
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3.3. Empirical framework 
 
a) Median voter health expenditure 
The starting point of our model is the level of per capita public health expenditure 
desired by the median voter. Following the previously described literature, this is 
assumed to be a linear function of real per capita income, the proportion of 
population aged 65 and over, supply variables and real per capita national transfer 
revenue to regions.
25
 Therefore, the estimated model can be written as: 
 
EXPit
V 
= 1 + 2 P_GDPit + 3 OLDit + 4 F_TRAit-1 + 5 HBit + 6 PHit + uit     [1] 
 
where the subscript it refers to region i in year t, EXP measures per capita public 
health expenditure at a regional level, P_GDP is per capita gross domestic 
product as a proxy of the median voter income; F_TRA indicates per capita 
intergovernmental grants; OLD is the percentage of population aged 65 and over; 
HB designates the number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants; PH is the 
number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants and uit is the disturbance term. 
 
b) Quality of public health services 
The above model assumes that the median voter is only interested in the level of 
public health expenditure and not also in the quality of the health services 
provided. If this is not the case, it might be that the median voter is willing to pay 
a higher price for better quality services. Therefore, equation [1] would become: 
 
EXP
*
it
V 
=  EXPit
V 
+ τ QUALit-1 + φ PRIV_EXPit        [1.1] 
 
This expression states that if the previous year quality of regional health 
services (QUALit-1) was high, the median voter is expected to pay for a fraction τ 
of it during the following year. It is also assumed that the quality of health 
services affects the level of private expenditure (PRIV_EXP). In particular, by 
                                                 
25
 Levaggi and Zanola (2003) take into account also private health expenditure as an independent 
variable to investigate the relationship between it and public spending.  
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making the hypothesis that the relationship between public and private 
expenditure is one of partial substitutability, a high level of public health care is 
likely to reduce the level of private expenditure. 
 
c)  Regional government target level of health expenditure 
We assume that each regional government pursues a target level of health 
expenditure, measured in per capita terms, which is generally higher than the one 
preferred by the median voter. The difference between the two levels depends on 
a portion λ (positive) of the regional per capita imbalance between target and 
actual per capita health expenditure in the previous year: 
 
   EXPit
T
 =  EXPit
V
+ λ IMBit-1                          [2] 
 
The regional per capita imbalance in year t-1 is given by the difference 
between health expenditure, grants from the central government (F_TRA) and 
local revenue (L_REV = taxes and co-payments) in that year, all expressed in per 
capita terms: 
 
        IMBit-1 = EXPit-1 - F_TRAit-1 - L_REVit-1         [2.1] 
 
Rules of financing regional health expenditure in Italy have changed repeatedly 
during the last decade. In general terms, the share of regional financing through 
local taxes and co-payments has grown considerably over time. Therefore, 
considering the lagged level of regional deficit allows avoiding a potential 
overestimate of the marginal effect of this variable in the first period when regions 
received funds for health care only through grants-in-aid. Furthermore, this partial 
adjustment model accounts for the dynamic behaviour of budgetary decisions.  
 
d) Effect of party competition 
Following Solè-Ollè (2006), we make two different hypotheses about the behaviour 
of politicians/parties: namely the Leviathan and the Partisan ones. Under the 
former hypothesis, it is assumed that the regional government, which acts as a 
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power-maximizing agent, selects a target level of public health expenditure that is 
always higher than the one desired by the median voter. Under the Partisan 
hypothesis, the target level of public health expenditure depends on the party 
ideology about the public sector size. Therefore, it is predicted that a left-wing 
regional government will select a target level that is higher than the one preferred 
by the median voter. The opposite will happen in the case of a right-wing regional 
government. Under both hypotheses, however, the target level of public health 
expenditure is influenced by political competition.  
In the literature, different ways of measuring the degree of party competition 
have been provided. One of the most used is the electoral margin obtained by the 
incumbent in the last round of voting [Tucker (1982); Boyne (1994)]. Following 
this approach, we measure the degree of political competition as the percentage of 
votes won by the actual party with the (relative) majority in the last election held 
(P_COMP): the higher (lower) this percentage, the lower (higher) the degree of 
political competition. In the Leviathan model [3.1], P_COMP is supposed to have 
a negative effect on expenditure growth, since a smaller electoral support for the 
majority party in power (suggesting more fragmentation and competition in the 
political arena) induces it to fulfil the level of expenditure wanted by the median 
voter. On the opposite, the Partisan model [3.2] predicts that increased competition 
reduces the level of public health expenditure for left-wing governments and increases it 
for right-wing ones. 
 
Leviathan model 
   EXPit 
T
= EXPit
V 
+ λ IMBit-1 +  P_COMPit        [3.1] 
 
Partisan model 
     EXPit
T 
= EXPit
V 
+ λ IMBit-1 +  LEFTit*P_COMPit       [3.2] 
 
An interesting aspect is given by the ability of voters to clearly identify the 
political responsibilities. In a proportional electoral system, with coalition 
governments, it might be difficult for the voter to assign political responsibilities 
for expenditure levels different from the desired ones [Powell and Whitten (1993); 
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Anderson (1995)]. In such a case, political competition becomes less effective in 
restraining expenditure since coalition governments are less prompted to pursue 
the interests of voters [Solè-Ollè (2006)].  
In the 1990s, Italian regions have undertaken electoral and government system 
reforms which have led to the direct election of the president.
26
 In this context, it 
is easier for the voter to identify the political responsibility of each government 
choice. To account for this institutional change, the previous Leviathan and 
Partisan models are amended as follows: 
 
Leviathan model 
  EXPit
T 
= EXPit
V 
+ μ MAJit + λ IMBit-1 +  P_COMPit    [3.1.a] 
 
Partisan model 
         EXPit
T 
= EXPit
V 
+ μ MAJit + λ IMBit-1 +  LEFTit*P_COMPit          [3.2.a] 
 
where MAJ is a dummy variable which assumes value equal to 1 in the years in 
which the majority rule applies and 0 otherwise. 
 
e) Special interest politics 
If the government is interested not only in the target level of expenditure but also 
in the spending composition so as to favour lobbies, equation [2] can be 
transformed into: 
 
EXPit
T 
= EXPit
V 
+ ρ LOB*EXPit-1 + λ IMBit-1              [4.1] 
 
where ρ is expected to be positive. 
 
 
                                                 
26
 This reform has not been implemented simultaneously in each region but in different years, 
according to regional constitutions. 
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3.4. Data 
The data set employed in this study consists of a sample of cross-sectional and 
time series observations for the 19 Italian administrative regions.
27
 Available 
information comes from several sources and covers the period 1989-2003. 
However, in the estimation process, only data for the period 1990-2003 are used 
as one year is needed to create the lagged variables. Therefore, the final simple 
results in 266 observations for 14 years. A detailed description of the variables 
used in the analysis, together with their summary statistics, is reported in Table 1.  
Many of them do not require further explanations since their inclusion is 
standard in the literature on the determinants of regional health expenditure. 
Monetary variables are all expressed in real per capita terms, at 1995 constant 
prices. As a proxy of the average quality of public health services (QUAL) we use 
the interregional patient mobility. We assume that whenever a region has a 
positive financial balance from patient mobility, the quality of its public health 
care services is higher than the national average.
28
  
The variable P_COMP measures the political competition which results from 
the fragmentation of the government coalition. It has been already mentioned that 
this variable is computed as the electoral percentage support obtained in the last 
election by the incumbent party having the majority of votes. As this percentage 
decreases, the leading party reduces its political influence and the political 
scenario becomes more fragmented; thus, competition between parties increases. 
The opposite has also been assumed to be true.  
As a proxy for special interest expenditure we assume the ratio between public 
expenditure for private specialist and pharmaceutical care and total public health 
care expenditure (LOB). To account for the effect of rounds of voting on public 
health expenditure, the variable E_YEAR is added which assumes value 1 in the 
years of regional elections and 0 otherwise. Finally, a standard linear time trend 
variable is included in the model to capture health sector price growth.  
 
 
                                                 
27
 We exclude Trentino Alto Adige, an autonomous region where the responsibility of public 
health care is devolved at a provincial level. 
28
 In Italy, citizens have free choice of the region in which to obtain health care. Regions of 
residence financially cover their patients’ mobility. 
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Table 1. Definition and summary statistics of the variables employed in the analysis 
 
Variable Meaning 
Data 
source(s) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
EXP 
Real per capita 
regional public 
health expenditure  
Ministry of  
Health   
Overall 995.04 135.22 708.20 1,342.18 
Between  76.71 850.82 1,129.41 
Within  112.64 779.44 1,247.94 
P_GDP 
Real per capita 
GDP  
ISTAT, 
Regional 
Accounts 
Overall 16,232.54 4,194.35 8,901.36 24,145.34 
Between  4,114.15 10,310.62 22,925.61 
Within  1,223.41 13,812.31 19,000.18 
OLD 
Percentage of 
population aged 65 
and over 
ISTAT, 
Regional 
Accounts 
Overall 17.94 3.19 10.82 26.18 
Between  2.96 12.83 23.60 
Within  1.35 15.34 20.57 
F_TRA 
Real per capita 
national transfers to 
regions 
SANITEIA 
and ISTAT 
(Regional 
Accounts) 
Overall 930.11 147.41 623.64 1,358.29 
Between  61.55 837.22 1,039.99 
Within 
 134.64 599.70 1,305.65 
HB 
Regional number of 
hospital beds per 
1,000 inhab. 
ISTAT, 
Italian 
Statistical 
Yearbook 
Overall 5.70 1.32 3.03 9.04 
Between  0.80 4.20 7.29 
Within 
 1.07 2.93 8.17 
PH 
Regional number of 
physicians per 
1,000 inhab. 
ISTAT, 
Italian 
Statistical 
Yearbook 
Overall 6.67 1.29 3.30 14.44 
Between  0.96 5.19 8.26 
Within 
 0.89 3.86 13.19 
QUAL 
Dummy variable 
for regions with a 
strictly positive 
financial patient 
mobility balance 
Ministry of  
Health   
Overall 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Between  0.39 0.00 1.00 
Within 
 0.30 -0.45 1.26 
PRIV_EXP 
Real per capita 
private (household) 
health expenditure  
ISTAT 
(Regional 
Accounts) 
Overall 283.80 74.56 136.15 443.75 
Between  55.36 188.45 366.78 
Within  51.43 144.78 364.68 
IMB 
Real per capita 
regional deficit  
Ministry of  
Health   
Overall 161.29 222.72 -396.43 1,379.98 
Between  140.11 13.20 488.28 
Within  175.89 -700.82 1,257.36 
P_COMP 
Electoral 
percentage obtained 
by the incumbent at 
the last election 
held 
Istituto 
Cattaneo 
Overall 34.65 8.81 17.00 47.20 
Between  5.52 23.56 44.11 
Within 
 6.98 17.42 47.58 
LEFT 
Dummy variable 
for regions with a 
left party in power 
Istituto 
Cattaneo 
Overall 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Between  0.39 0.00 1.00 
Within  0.31 -0.38 1.33 
MAJ 
Dummy variable 
equal to 1 when 
regional elections 
are based on the 
majority rule 
Istituto 
Cattaneo 
Overall 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Between  0.05 0.50 0.71 
Within 
 0.49 -0.14 1.08 
LOB 
Ratio of  regional 
private specialist 
and pharmaceutical 
expenditure on total 
regional public 
expenditure 
Ministry of  
Health   
Overall 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.31 
Between  0.03 0.11 0.21 
Within 
 0.03 0.10 0.26 
E_YEAR 
Dummy  variable 
for electoral years 
(regional elections) 
Istituto 
Cattaneo 
Overall 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Between  0.02 0.14 0.29 
Within  0.41 -0.07 1.07 
Note: all monetary values are expressed in Euros, at 1995 prices. 
 
 
 
3.5. Estimates and discussion of results 
As for the estimation methodology, we follow the previous literature which 
assumes poolability of the data and linearity of the functional form. There are 
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mainly two econometric approaches for analyzing the proposed models: the panel 
data approach (including pooled OLS, GLS random effects and panel fixed 
effects), and the cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and timewise autoregressive 
model, also known as the Parks-Kmenta approach.
29
 Given the short time period 
considered in this analysis, previous literature suggests to employ GLS random 
effects [Bordignon et al. (2003)].  
 
Table 2. Median voter expenditure 
 
 
Independent variable: EXP, in Euros at 1995 prices 
Functional form: linear 
Estimation period: 1990 – 2003 
Estimator: GLS random effects 
 
Variable 
(1) (1.1) 
EXP EXP* 
Constant 
234.345*** 291.897*** 
(45.483) (45.031) 
P_GDP 
0.007*** 0.009*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
OLD 
3.072 4.245** 
(1.906) (2.000) 
F_TRA (t-1) 
0.451*** 0.469*** 
(0.034) (0.032) 
HB 
15.907*** 6.314 
(3.668) (3.963) 
PH 
-0.808 -0.648 
(2.486) (2.347) 
QUAL 
 26.658*** 
 (7.047) 
PRIV_EXP 
 -0.283*** 
 (0.079) 
TREND 
127.945*** 113.397*** 
(8.415) (9.327) 
R2 
within 0.9047 0.9152 
between 0.8422 0.8304 
overall 0.8836 0.8892 
Breusch-Pagan LM(1) 225.52*** 247.76*** 
Observations 266 266 
Number of regions 19 19 
(1) Breusch-Pagan = Breusch-Pagan test OLS vs random effects. 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2 shows the estimation results of models [1] and [1.1]. These are 
generally in line with previous expectations. According to the existing literature, a 
positive sign should be expected for the variable measuring the effect of per capita 
income in model [1]. With regard to the aged population variable, a positive effect 
is expected in both models: all other things being equal, an increase in the 
regional proportion of population aged 65 and over is likely to determine an 
                                                 
29
 See Greene (2003). 
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increase in regional per capita public health expenditure. The variable for the 
quality of services (column 2) has a rather strong and significant impact on health 
expenditure and indicates the existence of a substitution effect between public and 
private health care. 
 
Table 3. Government target expenditure and political competition 
 
 
Independent variable: EXP, in Euros at 1995 prices 
Functional form: linear 
Estimation period: 1990 – 2003 
Estimator: GLS random effects 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EXP EXP EXP EXP EXP 
Constant 
205.072*** 235.399*** 243.452*** 204.220*** 208.657*** 
(44.946) (46.510) (47.418) (45.017) (43.784) 
Median voter expenditure 
P_GDP 
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
OLD 
4.922*** 4.756*** 5.548*** 4.979*** 4.079** 
(1.778) (1.777) (1.880) (1.823) (1.834) 
F_TRA (t-1) 
0.459*** 0.460*** 0.454*** 0.460*** 0.466*** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
HB 
16.057*** 18.834*** 16.901*** 16.157*** 16.008*** 
(3.575) (3.576) (3.916) (3.583) (3.472) 
PH 
-2.632 -3.655 -3.406 -2.802 -2.420 
(2.421) (2.454) (2.437) (2.461) (2.327) 
TREND 
125.124*** 121.566*** 122.077*** 125.094*** 124.698*** 
(8.308) (8.268) (8.249) (8.322) (8.307) 
Political variables 
IMB (t-1) 
0.051*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
P_COMP 
 -1.068*** -1.169***   
 (0.341) (0.353)   
MAJ 
  -9.059   
  (6.703)   
E_YEAR 
   1.798  
   (6.643)  
LEFT * P_COMP 
    0.224 
    (0.208) 
 
R2 
Within 0.9099 0.9117 0.9163 0.9117 0.9117 
between 0.8534 0.8551 0.8412 0.8505 0.8506 
overall 0.8912 0.8930 0.8919 0.8909 0.8910 
Observations 266 266 266 266 266 
Number of regions 19 19 19 19 19 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the estimation results for the effect of party competition in 
both the Leviathan and Partisan models. We adopt the prudential approach of 
testing the model by introducing one political variable at a time. Therefore, the 
comparison between columns one and two indicates the impact of political 
competition. In column three, the dummy variable for the effect of the 
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institutional transition to a majority system for regional election is inserted. The 
purpose is that of verifying whether this variable has an influence on the 
containment of public health expenditure due to a more visible responsibility of 
the winning party (or coalition). Column four shows the impact of the regional 
electoral year on public health expenditure, testing the possibility of a strategic 
use of deficit by the incumbent government. Column five reports the estimation 
results for the Partisan model. 
As expected, results from column two show a negative impact of political 
competition/fragmentation on the health expenditure variable in the Leviathan 
model. That is, when political competition increases, the regional government target 
level approaches the level desired by the median voter. On the contrary, for lower levels 
of political competition, the government target level is higher than the median voter 
spending level.  
Interestingly, the introduction of the majority system variable has a negative 
but not significant impact on regional public health expenditure. Similarly, the 
variable related to the election year is not statistically significant. Finally, in the 
Partisan model, where different ideological positions exist, political competition 
does not show a significant effect, although the sign of the variable is positive. 
Concerning the impact of quality (Table 4), results remain basically 
unchanged. Looking at the marginal effects of political competition and financial 
imbalance, these variables appear to have a more modest effect on regional public 
health expenditure than in previous estimates. This suggests that quality may be 
used by the electorate as an indirect (low-power) tool to control public 
expenditure. 
In Table 5, column three confirms that interest groups exert a significantly 
positive influence on public health expenditure at a regional level. The variable 
for political competition (computed as the percentage of votes over the total) 
continues to show a negative sign. An interesting result is that of quality. By 
comparing columns one and two, it appears that whenever quality is evaluated by 
the voters, the influence of interest groups on public health expenditure is lower.  
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Table 4. Government target expenditure and political competition when quality 
matters  
       
 
Independent variable: EXP, in Euros at 1995 prices 
Functional form: linear 
Estimation period: 1990 – 2003 
Estimator: GLS random effects 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EXP* EXP* EXP* EXP* EXP* 
Constant 
259.152*** 286.699*** 284.142*** 259.230*** 253.836*** 
(42.489) (43.026) (43.994) (42.590) (40.109) 
Median voter expenditure 
P_GDP 
0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
OLD 
5.492*** 5.593*** 5.243*** 5.625*** 4.615*** 
(1.645) (1.575) (1.665) (1.700) (1.608) 
F_TRA (t-1) 
0.480*** 0.484*** 0.492*** 0.480*** 0.490*** 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
HB 
7.204* 9.561*** 10.516*** 7.194* 7.822** 
(3.791) (3.615) (3.753) (3.817) (3.639) 
PH 
-1.840 -2.584 -2.629 -2.080 -1.170 
(2.242) (2.219) (2.199) (2.283) (2.199) 
TREND 
111.135*** 105.220*** 102.622*** 111.179*** 110.686*** 
(9.237) (9.374) (9.879) (9.297) (9.265) 
Quality of public expenditure 
QUAL 
23.217*** 20.815*** 21.095*** 23.733*** 20.185*** 
(6.809) (6.380) (6.369) (6.788) (6.913) 
PRIV_EXP 
-0.267*** -0.300*** -0.346*** -0.268*** -0.256*** 
(0.075) (0.076) (0.092) (0.076) (0.074) 
Political variables 
IMB (t-1) 
0.047*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
P_COMP 
 -1.100*** -1.068***   
 (0.333) (0.336)   
MAJ 
  7.958   
  (7.936)   
E_YEAR 
   1.213  
   (6.277)  
LEFT * P_COMP 
    0.138 
    (0.193) 
 
R2 
within 0.9123 0.9169 0.9123 0.9123 0.9121 
between 0.8560 0.8420 0.8513 0.8514 0.8595 
overall 0.8930 0.8919 0.8909 0.8910 0.8937 
Observations 266 266 266 266 266 
Number of regions 19 19 19 19 19 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Government target expenditure and special interests  
 
 
Independent variable: EXP, in Euros at 1995 prices 
Functional form: linear 
Estimation period: 1990 – 2003 
Estimator: GLS random effects 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
EXP EXP* EXP* 
Constant 
175.678*** 233.401*** 260.993*** 
(44.576) (43.936) (44.683) 
Median voter expenditure 
P_GDP 
0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
OLD 
6.206*** 6.352*** 6.329*** 
(1.788) (1.733) (1.669) 
 
F_TRA (t-1) 
0.398*** 0.422*** 0.428*** 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
 
HB 
12.440*** 5.227 7.675** 
(3.537) (3.779) (3.642) 
 
PH 
-2.599 -2.409 -3.084 
(2.430) (2.284) (2.260) 
TREND 
92.395*** 86.492*** 82.296*** 
(12.033) (11.624) (11.383) 
Quality of public expenditure 
QUAL 
 24.857*** 22.490*** 
 (6.855) (6.500) 
PRIV_EXP 
 -0.206*** -0.237*** 
 (0.078) (0.079) 
Political variables 
IMB (t-1) 
0.040** 0.037** 0.039** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
LOB * EXP (t-1) 
0.535*** 0.459*** 0.438*** 
(0.137) (0.133) (0.131) 
P_COMP 
  -1.048*** 
  (0.331) 
    
R2 
 
between 0.9096 0.9172 0.9187 
overall 0.8534 0.8395 0.8488 
within 0.8903 0.8892 0.8882 
Observations 266 266 266 
Number of regions 19 19 19 
Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks  
The preliminary results of this study offer some interesting insights on political 
economic aspects of health care decentralization in Italy. According to common 
wisdom, decentralization is likely to strengthen the control of the electorate on the 
public outcome and therefore to constrain public expenditure. This paper 
contradicts this presumption, showing that less fragmentation, implying a large 
electoral support for the main incumbent party, has a negative sign on regional 
health expenditure. Other interesting results have been derived relatively to the 
impact of quality perceived by the voters.  
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Clearly, this paper is still in a preliminary form and further analysis will be 
devoted to better define the basic political model aiming at capturing the impact 
of political competition on regional expenditure and deficits.  
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